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ABSTRACT
The airline industry downturn that began in early 2000 was exacerbated not only by the
terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, but also by other pressures
for strategic change. Continued growth and competition of low cost carriers coupled with
changing purchasing habits of passengers have led industry analysts, airline executives,
and investors alike, to question the continued viability of the traditional hub and spoke
airline strategy. The financial success of Southwest Airlines and other low cost carriers
is partly attributable to its high levels of employee productivity and equipment utilization.
In April 2002, American Airlines made a step toward emulating this facet of Southwest's
strategy by depeaking its flight schedule at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport.
American's schedule change was analyzed, and the decision was evaluated from the
market share, operational reliability, and cost perspectives. Average connection times
increased by 6 minutes, and the average number of connections per arriving flight
decreased by 2. Computer Reservation System market share data implied a market share
neutral decision. Department of Transportation on-time performance data implied an
improvement in reliability. Finally, the reduction in degree of schedule peaking implied
a potential cost improvement through increased equipment utilization, lower required
staffing levels, and improved employee productivity.
Thesis advisors: R. John Hansman, Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Thomas Kochan, George M. Bunker Professor of Management
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1 INTRODUCTION
The current airline industry downturn and subsequent financial crisis has revived
considerable debate about the continued viability of the traditional network carrier
business strategy. With increased competition, reduced passenger traffic, and falling
average fares, costs have become increasingly important determinants of carrier
profitability. Carriers previously reliant on business passengers' willingness to pay high
fares are now struggling to align previously unchecked costs with the new level of
revenues.
One example of a carrier's attempt to reduce costs is American Airlines's decision
to depeak its departure and arrival banks at O'Hare International Airport in April 2002.
The traditional network airline paradigm dictates a highly peaked schledule to minimize
passenger connection times; thus in turn increasing attractiveness of itineraries and
hopefully revenue. American's decision to depeak breaks away from the traditional
paradigm and could signal the advent of a new business model for network carriers.
To understand and evaluate the implications of the changes that American Airlines
has made to its schedule, one must first understand the context of these changes by
reviewing both the history of the industry and the nature of competition in the current
environment. This thesis will include a brief industry history with emphasis on past
events leading up to the development of hub and spoke networks as well as the high cost
structures of some carriers. Next, the recent financial crisis will be described and an
argument for strategic change will be presented. American's decision to depeak its
schedule will be introduced as a departure from traditional network carrier practices.
The schedule change is then analyzed for changes in connection times, degree of
peaking, and connectivity. Schedule performance is then analyzed and discussed form
the perspectives of market share, reliability, and cost. Finally, the thesis includes a
discussion of the overall merit of this new strategy in light of current industry conditions.
1.1 Brief History of the U.S. Commercial Airline Industry
Passenger aviation started after World War I when airplanes were plentiful, and
individuals who owned them were willing to ferry people short distances. There was no
scheduled service however, and given the breadth and power of the railroad industry, it
was unlikely any would develop without government intervention. In 1918, the U.S. Post
Office Department began airmail service. Over the next six years, scheduled airmail
service grew from the east coast to transcontinental service and included regularly
scheduled night flying. As the extent of airmail service grew, the railroads lost more and
more mail revenue; this led to the introduction of the Contract Air Mail, or Kelly Act of
1925.
The Kelly Act of 1925 turned over mail routes to private carriers and thus gave
the railroad executives the opportunity to buy or control airmail service. Soon many
different mail services competed across the country. This competition along with high
rates for carrying mail fostered technological innovation. The advent of more powerful
engines allowed the transport of not only mail, but also passengers. The Air Commerce
Act of 1926 established processes and procedures for cataloging and certifying the
airworthiness of aircraft and pilots. Soon, with the improvement of technology and
safety, and the popularity of Charles Lindberg, airmail carriers were supplementing their
income with passenger revenues.
In 1929, Postmaster General Walter Brown recognized the long-term need for
more organized development of passenger aviation. He outlined and began to implement
a plan for reforming the then-corrupt method of payment for airmail. He also began to
decrease the magnitude of payment of airmail service, thus encouraging efficiency
improvements and shifting air carrier profit reliance from mail to passengers. Brown also
used his authority to award mail routes as a means to effect air carrier consolidation, and
by the end of 1930, four major strong carriers existed: United, TWA, American, and
Eastern. Additionally, four major routes existed: three transcontinental routes (northern,
central, and southern) served by United, TWA, and American, and an east coast route
served by Eastern. At the same time, Pan Am served overseas routes. (Heppenheimer
1995)
1.1.1 Regulated competitive environment
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and its subsequent reforms established the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) and the Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA). Together, these
agencies monitored and regulated the economic performance and safety and operations of
the airlines. Specifically, the CAB set fares and determined which airlines could service
which cities. In 1958, the Federal Aviation Act limited the jurisdiction of the CAB to
routes that crossed over state lines and carriers who served such interstate routes. (Mola
2003)
During this regulated period, prices were set on a cost-plus basis. Additionally,
the CAB deliberately set prices even higher on popular routes in order to subsidize the
cost of serving smaller markets. Further, the level of profits a carrier was allowed was
proportional to its amount of capital investment, and so carriers were encouraged to add
more capacity in the form of larger planes and increased frequency. Thus, with
guaranteed profits, the costs and size of these national carriers grew somewhat
unchecked. (Chmura 1983)
The industry was not completely without competition during this period. Multiple
carriers often served large markets. In these markets, carriers competed on service:
number of passengers per flight attendant, better and more frequent meals, and more
frequent flights. The large carriers also competed with non-regulated carriers on popular
intrastate routes such as Los Angeles to San Francisco. In this market, the CAB allowed
the regulated airlines to drop prices to match those of the much lower cost Pacific
Southwest Airlines. (Chmura 1983)
1.1.2 Deregulation and the development of hub and spoke carriers
In 1978, the Airline Deregulation Act called for the gradual deregulation of the industry,
and the dissolution of the CAB by the end of 1984. The incumbent airlines were left to
decide for themselves which routes to serve. When the CAB was dissolved in 1984, its
remaining functions were transferred to the Department of Transportation (DOT).
Among these functions was the Essential Air Service program that ensured federal or
local government subsidies for carriers who could no longer afford to serve small and
midsize cities. (Chmura 1983)
The establishment of hubs was an outgrowth of the desire of established carriers
to offer more destinations and thus stimulate more demand. Hubs allowed carriers to
expand service networks for less cost than establishing service on each of the routes
separately. Hubs also allowed them to survive the burst of post-deregulation competition
by consolidating passengers headed to multiple destinations at spoke stations, and
redistributing them on connecting flights at the hub. Eventually, these connecting
passengers would subsidize the airline's domination of flight offerings and frequency at
hub airports, thus giving the airline a competitive advantage at the hub. (Brueckner and
Zhang 2001)
At the same time that the previously regulated airlines were adapting their operations
to the new environment through the development of hub and spoke systems, new
competitors also entered the scene. For example, Southwest Airlines, previously a Texan
intrastate service provider had the opportunity to grow its network. While Southwest
found it difficult to compete head-to-head at hubs with hub airlines, it chose to continue
the strategy that had worked so well in Texas of operating out of smaller, less used, near
by airports. (Gittell 2003)
2 AIRLINE CARRIER BUSINESS STRATEGIES
From the time of deregulation until the present, various airlines have entered and exited
the industry. Some carriers that faced financial difficulties successfully restructured
under Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, while others merged with stronger airlines. As
carriers grew and developed, two dimensions for classifying airline business strategies
emerged: cost and schedule.
2.1 The Threat of Low Cost Carriers
Often, airlines are categorized by whether or not they try to use lower costs as their
competitive advantage. Low cost carriers compete by lowering fares, yet maintaining
reasonable profit margins. Current low cost airlines include carriers such as Southwest
Airlines, Air Tran, American Trans Airways jetBlue Airways, and America West. In this
classification, low cost is usually synonymous with no frills service, which may or may
not be an appropriate indicator. Other indicators of low cost airlines include single class
seating, acquisition of used and refurbished aircraft, fleet commonality, and more
efficient use of assets such as people, fleet, facilities.
Carriers not considered to be low cost include those airlines that grew out of the
era of industry regulation. These airlines such as United, American, and Delta once
operated in an environment in which costs were not held in check because competition
was based not on fares, but on service. Higher quality service meant better meals, more
frequent and less full flights, and more flight attendants for a given number of passengers.
Following deregulation, theses added costs continued to be passed along to the
passengers. Another factor contributing to the high costs of some carriers is labor costs.
Airlines that grew out of the regulated era have been operating for more than 70 years,
and therefore, have more senior labor forces than some of the newer low cost carriers.
Finally, high costs have been attributed to a high mix of fleet types, low productivity
flight crew schedules, and the general complexity of operating a large network.
As low cost carriers have grown both in size and number, they have begun to
present a significant threat to larger, more costly airlines. By 2000, the low cost carriers
represented about 20% of available capacity and about the same level of domestic market
share. The low cost carriers now also provide competition in over 700 of the top 1000
domestic markets by enplanements. This low cost competition has continued to put
pressure on the larger higher cost carriers to reduced their costs and improve operational
efficiencies. It has also brought into question whether the some of the high costs are
inherent to the hub and spoke operations that emerged after deregulation.
2.2 Hub and Spoke Network Carriers
The other distinction often made between carriers is whether that airline operates its
schedule as hub and spoke or point-to-point. This categorization refers to the
methodology dominating schedule design. In the case of hub and spoke, or traditional
network carriers, flight schedules are built focusing on the hub airports and trying to
maximize the number of flight itineraries that can be built by connecting flights into and
out of the hubs. The traditional network carriers such as United and American had their
roots in the regulated environment and operated vast networks enhanced through
agreements with regional carriers and alliances with other network carriers.
Point-to-point operators focus instead on serving individual markets at high
frequency and see any connecting itineraries as "bonus." Current point-to-point operators
include Southwest Airlines and Jet Blue Airways. While some might claim that
Southwest also operates hubs since passengers do make connects, the difference is that
Southwest does not actively schedule these connections. Instead, connections are viewed
as bonus: an additional offering to their point-to-point operations. (Flint 1993, Flint 2002)
While some low cost carriers operate hub and spoke networks, Southwest Airlines's
point-to-point scheduling strategy is often a focal for comparison with the traditional
carriers. Whether or not a significant portion of Southwest's success can be attributed to
its scheduling methodology or not, has become a popular debate as traditional carriers
struggle against their low cost competition.
2.3 The Debate of Hub and Spoke versus Point-to-Point
The debate of hub and spoke versus point-to-point did not begin with the current industry
downturn. During the early 1990's during the first Gulf War, analysts already were
questioning whether the hub and spoke model was still viable. Some blamed over
capacity, economic recession, and carrier bankruptcies for the downturn, while others
claimed that all airlines needed to operate like Southwest Airlines. (Flint 1993) As a
result, large hub and spoke carriers began to offer more direct flights, and worked to
improve hub efficiencies with introduction of more regional and commuter aircraft. (Ott
Jan. 1993) Carriers such as United, Delta, and Continental also attempted low-cost,
short-haul service on some routes to try and head off the low cost competition. (Ott Nov.
1993) Finally, many smaller hubs were dropped or downgraded, as airlines focused on
hubs with large local populations so that carriers could cover the cost of complexity of a
hub with higher revenues from local passengers. (Feldman and Cameron 1993)
The merits of the hub and spoke strategy were still touted, as analysts and
academics alike stood behind the potential benefits: greater frequency and travel options,
access to small cities, increased competition for passengers. (Feldman and Cameron
1993, Nero 1999, Lepak 1997) At the time, however, both were quick to point out that
these benefits could only be realized if hubs were operated efficiently. (Aykin 1995)
American Airlines Chairman Robert Crandall blamed some of his company's losses on
the higher costs of carrying passengers through hub airports, specifically, the periods of
increased and decreased activity driven by the traditional short connection schedule
paradigm. Some analysts at the time also suggested carriers should consider more
continuous flight schedules like Southwest operates as shown in Figure 2.1. (Ott Nov.
1993, Feldman and Cameron 1993) This paradigm shift was not attempted, however as
the economy picked up, and airlines found revenue gains through revenue management
improvements and cost reductions by outsourcing services. (Costa et al. 2002)
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Figure 2.1 Southwest Airlines at PHX Arrivals and Departures in 15-minute Intervals,
April 2002
During this most recent downturn, the debate between hub and spoke and point-
to-point has again resurfaced. The criticisms are essentially the same: traditional hub
and spoke carriers are not experiencing cost economies of scale they should be.
Traditional carriers such as American, United, USAir, and Delta have much high costs
and much lower productivity than their lower cost competitors; therefore they find it
harder to continue to match these competitors low fares. (Feldman 2001, Donoghue
2002, McDonald 2002) This time, however, the possible solutions are less clear and
more difficult to implement. The next chapter will provide more detail about the current
crisis, what the airlines have done thus far in an\attempt to recover, and what makes this
crisis different than previous downturns.
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3 CURRENT INDUSTRY CRISIS
3.1 Industry Performance and Response
As seen in Figure 3.1, the current industry crisis began in 2000, when carrier profits fell
significantly from the highs of the previous three years. In 2001, the U.S. carriers
suffered unprecedented losses, in part due to the terrorist attacks of September 11, as
highlighted by the dramatic one-time drop in revenue passenger miles (RPMs) as shown
in Figure 3.2. While RPMs did partially recover from the sharp decline in September
2001, passenger traffic never returned to early 2001 or 2000 levels.
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Figure 3.1 U.S. Airline Industry Carrier Net Profit or Los.
Another factor contributing to carrier losses was the decreasing revenue per
passenger as shown in Figure 3.3. This chart shows that airfares had been declining from
previous years since March 2001, and only continued to fall during 2002. With the
decline in fares and the reduction in passenger traffic, total passenger revenue had
declined significantly. Fears of further terrorist attacks, the war on terrorism, and the
impending war with Iraq and fear of increased fuel costs all retarded traffic recovery.
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In response to the sharp decline in passenger traffic, the U.S. carriers cut capacity
as seen in the chart of available seat miles (ASMs) for 2000, 2001, and 2002 in Figure
3.4. A significant drop in capacity followed the September 11 terrorist attacks, and
though capacity again rose, it did not return to 2000 levels. Capacity was cut slightly
higher than passenger demand dropped, however, and 2002 load factors increased
slightly over 2001 levels as seen in Figure 3.5. This means that even though both traffic
and capacity were down, passengers were not necessarily noticing a difference on their
flights, which were as full or fuller than before September 11.
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Figure 3.4 U.S. System-wide ASMs
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Figure 3.5 U.S. System-wide Load Factor
3.2 Specific Carrier Performance and Response
The previous section presented industry level changes in profit, passenger traffic, but did
not address how different carriers were affected by these changes. Figure 3.6 shows the
quarterly profit and loss for four of the major U.S. carriers: American Airlines (AA),
United Airlines (UA), Delta Airlines (DL), and Southwest Airlines (WN). The data show
that traditional network carrier profitability had been deteriorating since after the second
quarter of 2000. The terrorist attacks during the third quarter of 2001 only served to
exaggerate these losses. Southwest profitability, however was only slightly affected by
the downturn in 2000, and decreased a lower percentage after September 11, than did the
other carriers.
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Figure 3.6 Carrier Profit and Loss, Q1 2000 through Q2 2002
Aside from remaining profitable since early 2000, Southwest's performance has
deviated from the traditional hub and spoke carriers in other ways. For example, by the
end of September 2001, the majority of U.S. major carriers had announced plans for
employee lay-offs. (Ott 2001) As time progressed, many carriers added to those initial
estimates as more capacity cuts took place, accompanied by service reductions and new
aircraft deferment. (Bond Sept. 2002) At the same time, United and US Airways, and
Northwest, Continental, and Delta sought to establish extensive code-share agreements
that would effectively broaden those carriers' networks. Meanwhile, a handful of low
cost carriers including Air Tran, jetBlue, and Southwest continued to grow their
networks, establishing more service, upgrading their fleet, and maintaining their
workforces. (Bond Mar. 2002)
At the time of publication of this thesis, US Airways and United Airlines were
restructuring under Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, American Airlines stock was no
longer listed on the S&P 500, while the market capitalization of Southwest Airlines and
jetBlue Airways far outweighed their share of RPMs. (See Figure 3.7) These data imply
that investors are demanding more than market share from the airlines. Investors are
instead rewarding the slow, steady growth and consistent profitability of airlines such as
Southwest.
25%
Delta If' 1:1 slope
20%
- American
" United
u*15%
+ Northw6st
10%
A Contiiental Southwest
US Airways
5% /
Aiierica West
,ATA U jetBlue
0% .
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Relative market capitalization
Source: 'Yahoo! Finance and airline traffic reports
Figure 3.7 RPM Share versus Relative Market Capitalization, All U.S. Majors, Plus ATA
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3.3 Additional Pressure for Strategic Change
The data presented in Section 3.1 and Section 3.2 imply, and many industry analysts and
investors agree, that the U.S. airline industry is at the dawning of a new era. With
revenue per passenger falling, the previously effective profit lever of large network
carriers is getting smaller and smaller. An obvious cause of this revenue decline is the
price pressure from the low cost carriers. This price pressure will drive change because
the lew cost carriers can remain profitable at a lower average fare, thus driving carriers
with higher costs into bankruptcy.
The lower costs and lower fares of these airlines are not a result of the current
crisis, however and therefore are not the only reason that this industry downturn differs
from others of the past. Carriers have attempted to recover by using their usual methods
of lay offs and wage concessions to cut costs. Clearly other dynamics in the industry are
contributing to this call for permanent, strategic change. Other possible factors include:
customer choice and near perfect information, labor relations and labor costs, and
decreasing willingness to pay.
3.3.1 Customer choice- near perfect information
Prior to the advent of the Internet, most flight reservations were booked through travel
agencies via the Customer Reservation System (CRS), or directly with the airline. In
each case, the booking agent controlled the amount of information shared with the
customer about flight options. Customers could influence choice by asking for specific
travel dates and times, or airlines, but the agent booking the reservation could have
conflicting interests due to airline incentives. Flights for a given origin-destination city
pair (O-D) appeared ranked by departure time and total elapsed time. Showing up on the
"first screen" of the CRS search was an important factor in the number of bookings an
airline received, thus influenced market share. Competition for positions on that first
screen was fierce and airlines sought to schedule flights with the most popular departure
times and the shortest connection times. (McDonald 2002)
As more and more ticket sales started to take place on the Internet, customers
gained much more knowledge about their travel options. An individual traveler was
more likely to take the time to view multiple screens worth of options. Most importantly,
the default on many Internet travel sites is to display itineraries in order of increasing
price; therefore, encouraging travelers to place more importance on price rather than
time. Finally, the DOT started to require airlines to publish the on-time (within 15
minutes) performance of each scheduled flight, so customers could start to judge for
themselves which flight would get them to their destinations at the right time and for the
right price.
This shift in power away from the airlines and the travel agents has made it
possible for customers to see the competitive landscape more clearly. Further, customers
know that they can book flights at the last minute and find the least expensive fare on the
flight, or the most expensive fare, depending on the method of searching for a flight.
This added knowledge is causing airlines that were traditionally dependent on business
travelers willing to pay high fares to reassess their revenue management strategies
recognizing that the near perfect information of customer choice might no longer sustain
a strategy of charging a different price to every customer. (Costa et al. 2002, Donoghue
2002)
3.3.2 Labor relations and labor costs
Another element of the current industry providing pressure for permanent structural
change is high labor costs. High labor costs can be attributed to at least two different
sources: the era of regulated operations, and a history of poor management/labor
relations. During the time period that the industry was regulated, the government price
setting policies allowed carriers to operate with a cost-plus mentality. The airlines
reported their costs, and the government ensured that fares were high enough to cover
costs, plus maintain a particular profit margin. Airline management, therefore, often
found it easier to avoid confrontation with labor unions than to risk revenue losses due to
a strike. (Mola 2003, Chmura 1983)
When the industry was deregulated, there was a spurt of growth as more
passengers began to travel. By the time the price competition from airlines such as
Southwest began to significantly erode carrier revenues, many of the large network
carriers were locked into expensive labor contracts with their various unions. A limiting
aspect of many airline labor contracts is the low level of employee productivity written
into the contract. (Sprayregen et al. 2002)
The high level of labor costs is not the only problem to over come. Many carriers
in the industry are also faced with confrontational rather than cooperative relationships
with their union work forces. A history layoffs, pay cuts, and work slowdowns as well as
competition for the highest wage among unions at different airlines, have all served to
breed mistrust and confrontation between labor and management. These degraded
relationships have not only sustained high labor costs, but also have often prevented
airlines from taking advantage of productivity improvements through any means other
than lay-offs.
Again, the contrary example in the airlines industry is Southwest Airlines.
Southwest has not laid off a single employee and has maintained high levels of employee
productivity and cooperative behavior. (Gitell, 2003) As investors and passengers'
awareness of Southwest and its business practices increase, the traditional carriers feel
pressure to understand and copy elements if its business strategy.
3.3.3 Unwillingness to pay
A third factor that contributed to the need for structural reform in the airline industry was
an emerging unwillingness to pay high fares. Part of this unwillingness to pay stemmed
from the near perfect information now available to customers as described in Section
3.3.1. Another contributing factor may have been that the cross-industry call for "faster,
better, cheaper" reached the air passengers. In the case of air travel, faster would mean
not just a faster travel time, but a faster, easier ticketing, check-in, boarding, connection,
and customer service experience. Better means less hassle, fewer lines, flexible rules,
extensive choice, and reliable service. Finally, cheaper means that the airlines need to do
it all, do it well, do it for less.
The call for cheaper air fares has come not only for the traveler paying for his or
her own ticket, but also from companies who pay the bill for business travelers. The
Lean movement has taken hold in many in many industries, driven by customers'
demands and competition from lower cost competitors. As a result, companies are
struggling to find ways to cut costs in order to provide faster, better, cheaper products and
services to their own customers. (Jordan and Michel 2001) Part of cutting costs and
improving processes to increase productivity is the elimination of non-value added work,
activities, and expenses. (Hammer 2001)
Increased company cost consciousness has had a number of effects on business
travel and business fares paid to airlines. First, large companies have used their
bargaining power to negotiate lower corporate rates and fewer scheduling restrictions.
Alternatively, companies are encouraging employees to limit their trips, and/or book
lower fares with restrictions. Finally, more companies and employees are making use of
travel alternatives such as video conferencing, teleconferencing, and various information
technology tools. (Costa et al. 2002, Velocci 2002, Sprayregen 2002)
These pressures for price reduction, cost reduction, and productivity
improvements all lead to the need for significant change in the industry. While
Southwest Airlines and some other low cost carriers are well prepared to compete in this
changed environment, the traditional hub and spoke carriers are not. As US Airways and
United Airlines restructure themselves under Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, and
American Airlines struggles to make changes outside of bankruptcy court, all three will
need to make lasting and dramatic changes. For US Air and United, changes come in the
form of contract renegotiations, and wage concessions. Thus far, only American has
taken a significant step away from business as usual in the form of depeaking its schedule
at Chicago O'Hare International Airport.
3.4 American Airline's Hub Paradigm Shift
As mentioned in Section 2.2, one of the mantras of the traditional hub and spoke network
schedule is the peaking of flights in and out of the hub airport. Motivated by the desire to
offer customers the shortest connection times and depart at popular times, thus earning a
spot on the first CRS screen, carriers such as American Airlines had very peaked
schedules. Figure 3.8 depicts AA's scheduled mainline arrivals and departures over
fifteen minute intervals' out of O'Hare International Airport (ORD) for March of 2002.
'It should be noted that dividing flight departures or arrivals into 15-minute intervals can be misleading if
all flights are in reality scheduled near one end of the interval.
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Figure 3.8 American Airlines Scheduled Mainline Arrivals and Departures in 15-minute
Intervals at ORD, March 2002
As a result of the competitive effects of low cost carriers such as Southwest
Airlines, as well as the other pressures for strategic change highlighted in Section 3.3,
American Airlines decided to experiment with depeaked banks at O'Hare. In April 2002,
American moved toward a more continuous flow of arrivals and departures as depicted in
Figure 3.9 While a depeaked schedule runs the risk of reduced revenue potential, a steady
flow of departures and arrivals should have a favorable effect on operational costs.
Without the extreme peaks and valleys of its previous schedule, AA has the potential to
improve employee productivity and facility and equipment utilization. If these potential
cost reductions outweigh potential revenue losses, American has made an important step
toward restructuring itself to better compete in this changed industry. Additionally,
American has shown investors that it is willing to change and more importantly, to try
and become more like Southwest.
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Figure 3.9 American Airlines Scheduled Mainline Arrivals and Departures in 15-minute
Intervals at ORD, April 2002
4 ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
The analysis of American Airlines's decision to depeak its flight schedule at O'Hare
includes: a high level look at the schedule changes compared with previous AA
schedules as well as other airline hub schedules; an assessment of the effects of the
change on degree of peaking and connectivity including measurements such as average
connection time, average number of possible connections per flight arriving into the hub,
and discussion of network effects; an assessment of actual schedule performance through
the evaluation of market share data and DOT reported reliability data. Prior to
performing any analysis, however, one must attempt to understand the limitations of the
proposed analysis and available sources of data.
4.1 Analysis uncertainties
Isolating the effects of a schedule change is extremely challenging. The more cities an
airline serves, the more complicated the network, and the more complexity in the system.
The more complex a system, the less clear the cause and effect relationships of specific
changes. One must also take into account, or at least consider, a variety of additional
changes and effects that might influence the analysis such as: seasonality, one-time
shocks or changes, industry trends, and iterative changes.
Seasonal effects can occur in both passenger demand and traffic patterns. During
winter months, for example, warm, sunny destinations maintain a higher level of leisure
traffic than other destinations, while overall demand increases during summer months
with more vacation travel. Changing seasons also mean changing weather patterns.
Changes in the weather can have adverse effects on reliability measures such as on-time
departures and arrivals. There are also network effects of such delays: a severe
thunderstorm in Chicago can cause a flight delay out of Los Angeles. Likewise, a late
arrival at Boston from Chicago can in turn lead to a late departure from Boston, thus
causing a cascade of delays. Finally, seasonal changes in the jet stream cause airlines to
adjust their expected flight times to the wind in order to more accurately predict the
arrival of flights at their destinations.
One-time industry-wide or carrier specific shocks can come in a number of forms.
The most obvious of the recent past was the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
causing an unprecedented depression of air travel, as well as sharp declines in industry
wide capacity. Another such shock was American Airlines's acquisition of significant
assets from the estate of TWA in early 2001. Through this transaction, American not
only gained additional fleet and personnel, but also gained an additional hub airport in St.
Louis. The addition of a new centrally located hub increases the number of flight options
for connecting passengers.
The same industry trends mentioned in Section 3.1 can also influence the results
of an analysis. Decreasing demand, capacity, and revenue as well as changes in customer
preference and buying power (referred to in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.3) can all influence
carrier market share. Increasing load factors can lead to more frequent departure delays
as it takes longer to board a full flight than it takes to board one that is half empty. Fewer
departures and arrivals at specific airports such as O'Hare can decrease air and runway
traffic, thus improving on-time performance for all carriers at that airport.
Perhaps the most difficult changes to account for in assessing American's
decision to depeak its schedule at O'Hare are the small iterations the airline and its
competitors make to their schedules and operations. Such changes include block time
adjustments, turn time changes, flight cancellations, boarding procedure changes, arrival
and departure measurements. Many of these frequent and difficult to track changes
influence the consistency of DOT reliability reporting. Consider, the factors involved in
the evaluation of the on-time performance of a flight: scheduled departure and arrival
times, and actual departure and arrival times. Increasing the estimated block time (gate to
gate time) and holding all else equal can improve the reliability measurements.
Completing the boarding process earlier and leaving the gate before the scheduled
departure time might result in a similar performance improvement. These types of
changes in scheduling and operations policies and procedures clearly complicate the
assessment of true performance.
4.2 Data set descriptions
In order to address some of the uncertainties addressed above, comparisons performance
are made for two different sets of times. First, comparisons are made with data
summarized at the month level for March and April of 2002. This time period represents
the initial change from the traditionally peaked schedule at O'Hare to the rolling hub.
Comparing data from two consecutive months has the advantage of the industry being
relatively stable with respect to the previously mentioned trends in revenue, capacity, and
traffic, as well as after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Also, both months are
after the integration of TWA fleet, personnel, and routes, hopefully minimizing any
network effects of the merger.
To address some of the seasonality issues, data from July of 2001 and July of
2002 also are compared where appropriate. The month of July was selected because it
usually represents peak demand, and because it allows a few months for American to
have made minor adjustments to its new schedule philosophy, as well as time for
passengers to react to advertised changes in schedule structure while choosing flights.
Finally, having a comparison of pre and post September 11, 2001 data might help to
discriminate between effects of system-wide changes and effects of schedule changes.
Three main sources of data were used for the analysis: Official Airline Guide
(OAG), Department of Transportation (DOT), and Computer Reservation System (CRS).
The OAG data contain airline schedule information as reported by the individual carriers
and include details such as scheduled departure and arrival time, aircraft type, scheduled
day of week. DOT data sources were used for reliability data such as on-time
performance, delay minutes, and taxi times. Finally, CRS data were used to estimate
carrier market share.
The majority of data manipulations and calculations were performed using
existing and modified SAS programs at United Airlines. A significant portion of the
analysis required the evaluation of connecting itineraries. As the OAG contains only
scheduled flight leg information, a methodology must be adopted to identify possible
connecting flights, and determine itinerary viability. The chosen methodology can
greatly bias any analysis performed. United Airlines created the itinerary sets used for
this analysis. A brief description of the rules most likely to bias this analysis can be
found in Appendix A.
In order to simplify the analysis, the author chose to further limit the set of
itineraries. First, unless otherwise noted, only domestic mainline and commuter flights
are considered. Second only flights scheduled to operate on a daily basis were
considered. Additionally, the set of itineraries includes only direct connections, single
stops, and single connections. Itineraries requiring more than one connection were not
considered- primarily to reduce the data set size, but also because the relevance of the
schedule change for double connecting passengers is presumably less than for single
connecting passengers. Finally, unless otherwise noted, the analysis is performed with
sets of itineraries that include only the first best connection for each city pair. In brief,
this means that for any given arriving flight, only one connection will be build for any
given final destination. This itinerary generation rule is further described in Appendix A.
The discussion in this section was intended to prepare the reader for the
presentation and discussion of the analysis, rather than to address thoroughly each
concern. More specifics about the data sets and their limitations will be addressed as data
are presented. The remaining sections of this chapter will readdress different points
raised in this section and discuss them in the context of the presented data and analysis.
5 ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN AIRLINES'S DEPEAKED SCHEDULE AT O'HARE
5.1 Overview of Schedule Changes
Section 3.4 introduced the changes that American Airlines made to its schedule in April
2002. Figure 5.1 shows a direct comparison of the American Airlines domestic mainline
scheduled departures from O'Hare International Airport in March and April 2002. In this
depiction, one can see that American's new scheduling philosophy essentially cut off the
tops of the nine previously distinct peaks and redistributed flights into the surrounding
time intervals, thus flattening out the banks rather than eliminating them altogether. As a
result, the maximum number of departures per 15-minute interval has changed from 19 in
March 2002, to 10 in April 2002. Figure B. 1 in Appendix B shows a similar trend for the
comparison of the July 2001 and July 2002 departure schedules, with the maximum
number of departures per 15-minute interval changing from 18 in July 2001 to 10 in July
2002.
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Figure 5.1 Comparison of Domestic Mainline Scheduled Departures per 15-minute
Interval, American Airlines at ORD, March and April 2002
Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 show how the schedules of American domestic
commuter and international flights changed. The commuter flight schedule has also been
slightly depeaked, with the maximum number of flights scheduled per fifteen-minute
interval dropping from 9 to 5. The changes in the distribution of international departures
are likely attributable to seasonal schedule changes rather than the depeaking decision.
Figure B.2 and Figure B.3 in Appendix B confirm that the depeaking in April 2002 was
isolated to American's O'Hare hub. Both the American Dallas-Fort Worth and St. Louis
hubs have very peaked schedules with distinct arrival and departure banks as well as
periods of little to no flight activity.
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Figure 5.2 Comparison of Domestic Commuter Scheduled Departures per 15-minute
Interval, American Airlines at ORD, March and April 2002
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Figure 5.3 Comparison of International Scheduled Departures per 15-minute Interval,
American Airlines at ORD, March and April 2002
5.1.1 Comparison of American Airlines's schedule with other airline hubs
Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5 show the April 2002 departure schedules of United Airlines at
O'Hare and Southwest Airlines at Phoenix, respectively. United's schedule has strongly
peaked banks during the first half of the day, moving toward more continuous departures
in mid-afternoon, returning to more traditional, yet tightly packed banks as the day ends.
United's flight schedule at Denver does not show the same depeaking in the afternoon,
instead maintaining distinct banks with distinct arrival and departure components
throughout the entire day. For details, see Figure B.4 in Appendix B.
Southwest Airlines's schedule at Phoenix as previously shown in Section 2.3
shows a much more steady flow of departures and arrivals. While the total number of
daily flights is significantly lower than American's, American's new scheduling strategy
clearly emulates Southwest's.. Figure B.5 in Appendix B shows that Southwest uses a
similar scheduling philosophy at Chicago Midway Airport.
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Figure 5.4 United Airlines at ORD Scheduled Departures in 15-minute Intervals, April 2002
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Figure 5.5 Southwest Airlines at PHX Scheduled Departures in 15-minute Intervals, April
2002
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5.1.2 Comparison of degree of peaking
The figures described in Section 5.1.1 provide a quick visual description of the
differences in schedule structure at the various hub airports. The fact that the different
airlines and hubs operate different numbers of daily flights; however, make it more
difficult to compare the "degree of peaking" of a given set of schedules. Figure 5.6
through Figure 5.9 show the flights scheduled per 15-minute interval as a percentage of
total departures for AA at ORD in March 2002, AA at ORD in April 2002, UA at ORD in
April 2002, and WN at PHX in April 2002. For a more direct carrier-to-carrier
comparison, only the time interval from 6AM to 10PM was considered. While the trends
in general are the same as were seen in the non-normalized data, it is now possible to
make direct comparisons between American Airlines or United Airlines and Southwest
Airlines.
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Figure 5.6 American Airlines at ORD Scheduled Departures in 15-Minute Intervals, March
2002, Normalized by Number of Flights
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Figure 5.7 American Airlines at ORD Scheduled Departures in 15-Minute Intervals, April
2002, Normalized by Number of Flights
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United Airlines at ORD Scheduled Departures in 15-minute Intervals, April
2002, Normalized by Number of Flights
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Figure 5.9 Southwest Airlines at PHX Scheduled Departures in 15-minute Intervals, April
2002, Normalized by Number of Flights
Table 5-1 lists the mean and standard deviation for the percentage of daily
departures scheduled per 15-minute interval for the airline hub schedules depicted above,
as well as for AA at DFW in April 2002, UA at DEN in April 2002, and WN at MDW in
April 2002. (The plots for these additional hubs can be viewed in Figures B6 through B8
in Appendix B.) If the flights were evenly distributed throughout the day, then the mean
would be 1.45% of departures scheduled per 15-minute interval and, the standard
deviation would be 0%. Comparing the means and standard deviations with the visual
charts above, one can see that in cases where the standard deviation is greater than the
mean, the schedule has a lot of peaks. If the standard deviation is less than the mean,
then flights are more evenly scheduled throughout the day.
The standard deviation measurements show a decrease for American's schedules
at O'Hare from 1.79% in March 2002 to 0.82% in April 2002. Now, the variation in
American's schedule at O'Hare is much closer to Southwest's at Phoenix which was
0.85% in April 2002. Comparing American in March with United in April, one can see
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that United's schedule was already less peaked (1.42%) at O'Hare than was American's
schedule (1.79%). Finally, the schedules for American at Dallas-Fort Worth and United
at Denver have the greatest standard deviations of the group at 2.31% and 2.14%
respectively.
Table 5-1 Mean and
Mean percentage
departures per
interval
Departure STD
Number of
scheduled
departures
2.50%
2.00%
1.50%
1.00%
0.50%
0.00%
Standard Deviation of Percentage of Total Flights Scheduled per 15-
minute Interval
AA-
ORD
Mar-02
1.54%
1.79%
283
AA-
ORD
Apr-02
1.52%
0.82%
307
AA-
DFW
Apr-02
1.54%
2.31%
424
UA-
ORD
Apr-02
1.54%
1.42%
346
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Figure 5.10 Degree of Peaking versus Number of Scheduled Departures
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Figure 5.10 is a graphical representation of the degree of peaking, or standard
deviation of scheduled departures, versus the number of departures scheduled over the
selected time interval. The figure again shows that American's degree of peaking
decreased while the total number of scheduled departures slightly increased. It also
shows that American's schedule at DFW not only has a significantly greater number of
departures, but also has a high degree of peaking than the other hubs represented.
5.2 Network Effects of Schedule Change
For the hub and spoke carriers, an important aspect of the flight schedule at a hub is its
degree of connectivity. Figure 5.11 is a notional representation of where various airline
hub airport schedules fall on the range of low to high degrees of connectivity and
peaking. Hubs included for comparison are American Airlines at O'Hare (AA ORD)
both before (old) and after (new) the schedule change, United Airlines at O'Hare (UA
ORD), Delta Airlines at Atlanta (DL ATL), Northwest Airlines at Memphis (NW MEM),
Continental Airlines at Newark (CO EWR), and Southwest Airlines at Phoenix (WN
PHX). The location for the degree of connectivity was loosely based on the number of
daily flights at that hub and the number of possible connections per arrival. The location
for the degree of peaking was based on the comparison of mean and standard deviation of
percentage of total flights scheduled per 15-minute interval as described in Section 5.1.2.
While more exact positions in this space might be assigned, the relative positions
of the various hubs are enough for understanding the implication of the change that
American has made at O'Hare. Prior to April 2002, American Airlines's schedule at
ORD had both a high degree of connectivity and high degree of peaking. After the
change, one could argue that the degree of connectivity might have decreased only
slightly, while the degree of peaking decreased significantly. One could also argue that
American Airlines has entered a new competitive space, being the only airline to operate
a hub schedule with both a high degree of connectivity and a low degree of peaking.
If one believes that a high degree of peaking is a proxy for operational
complexity, and thus cost, one could argue that airlines operating in the upper right
quadrant offer customers a large number of convenient connections, but at a high cost.
On the other hand, carriers operating in the lower right quadrant maintain lower costs, but
do not offer as many flight connections. While this framework makes it easy to compare
the connectivity of a schedule at a specific airport, it is not as useful for understanding the
effects on the connectivity of an airline's entire network. The framework also does not
distinguish what characteristics of connectivity have changed. The following sections
propose a few methods for analyzing the change in connectivity of American's schedule
at both a network level and a hub level and attempt to identify the specific changes in
connectivity at the hub.
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Figure 5.11 Notional Graphic of Carrier Hub Schedule Degree of Connectivity versus
Degree of Peaking
Source: Chris Spidle at United Airlines
5.2.1 Network connectivity
Perhaps the simplest measure of entire network connectivity is the comparison of how
many origin destination (OD) pairs a given airline serves. Such a calculation considers
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both how many different cities an airline serves as well as how many of those cities are
connected with each other. An alternative measure is to consider instead the number of
possible itineraries a customer can book on a given airline on a given day and normalize
that number by the total number of daily flights the airline operates. This measure would
consider not only the number of cities that are connected, but also the path and frequency
of connection. The ratio of possible itineraries to number of daily departures could also
be thought of as the average number of possible paths a passenger could be taking for any
given number of enplanements.
Table 5-2 contains the number of possible itineraries per departure, the number
directional OD pairs, and the number of OD pairs per departure for the major U.S.
airlines (plus jetBlue) for both March and April of 2002. The data are ordered by
decreasing number of possible itineraries per departure in April 2002. The number of
possible itineraries represents all direct flights, single stops, and valid single first best
connections as defined in Appendix A. Comparing the two measures, one immediately
sees that the rank of a number of the airlines would be different if the table was ordered
instead by the number of directional OD pairs. For example, America West would be
ranked lower, and Delta and Southwest would be ranked higher. As expected, there is a
correlation between the number of OD pairs and the itineraries per departure, as
confirmed by the similar directional change in the two measures from March to April.
The measurement of itineraries per departure suggests that American Airlines's
network connectivity dropped slightly between March and April 2002. It is not clear,
however if this change in connectivity was a result of depeaking at O'Hare or a result of a
reduced number of OD pairs. To try and better understand how the changes at ORD may
have affected the entire network, the next section will examine connectivity at the hub
level.
Table 5-2 Measures of Network-level Connectivity
Possible
itineraries per
denarture
Apr-02
32.7
24.0
21.5
18.7
18.5
18.0
17.0
12.4
9.1
5.8
5.5
4.9
2.5
Directional OD
pairs
Mar-02
17704
17876
19055
4780
16164
14690
12033
927
2513
763
557
2330
120
Apr-02
17569
17431
19163
4974
15265
14791
12012
1035
2814
779
558
2322
120
5.2.2 Change in hub connectivity
Similar to the method applied in Section 5.2.1 for network level connectivity, one
measure of how the connectivity of American's schedule has changed locally at O'Hare
would be to calculate the number of possible itineraries that pass though O'Hare. Table
5-3 shows the number of possible AA connecting itineraries passing through ORD and
the number of scheduled daily departures from ORD for March and April 2002. The total
number of departures includes both mainline and commuter flights because the possible
itineraries include these flights as well. Even though both the number of departures and
the number of connecting itineraries increased in April, the ratio of the two actually
decreased. This discrepancy implies a slight decrease in connectivity at the hub from
March to April when American depeaked its flight schedule.
Table 5-3 Measures of Hub-level Connectivity, AA at ORD
Number of possible
connecting itineraries
through ORD
Number of daily
departures from
ORD
March 2002 16,168 450 35.9
April 2002 16,897 478 35.3
CO
NW
DL
HP
AA
UA
US
F9
AS
FL
TZ
WN
B6
Airline
Continental
Northwest
Delta
Am West
American
United
US Air
Frontier
Alaska
AirTran
ATA
Southwest
jetBlue
Mar-02
32.5
24.2
21.0
16.9
18.9
18.0
17.1
11.8
8.7
5.8
5.6
4.9
2.5
Itineraries
per
departure
_____ _______
I
Another element of connectivity at a hub level to consider is the number of
possible connections a passenger can make after arriving on an incoming flight. Figure
5.12 shows two histograms comparing distribution of the number of possible connections
for each arriving flight for American Airlines at O'Hare in March and April 2002. The
distributions imply a slight decrease in the number of connections a passenger can make
on any given American flight into O'Hare. The average number of connections per
arrival was 36 in March 2002 and 34 in April 2002. These data are summarized in Table
5-4.
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Figure 5.12 Histogram of Number of Connections per Arriving Flight, AA at ORD
Table 5-4 Number of Possible Connections per Arriving Flight, AA and UA at ORD
Figure 5.13 shows the comparison of distribution of United Airlines arrivals by
the possible number of connections for March and April 2002. Again, these data include
both mainline and commuter arrivals and connecting itineraries. In general, a passenger
arriving on a United flight at O'Hare will have more options for connections than an
American passenger. The average number of connections per arrival for United at ORD
was 42 in March 2002 and 41 in April 2002. These data are also summarized in Table
5-4.
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Figure 5.13 Histogram of Number of Connections per Arriving Flight, UA at ORD
Figure 5.14 shows the average number of possible connections per arriving flight
versus the degree of peaking as defined in Section 5.1.2. These data confirm the
hypothesis that American has decreased its degree of peaking at O'Hare with minimal
impact on the connectivity of the hub. Of course, the number of connections per arrival
represents only one measure of hub connectivity. In addition to how many connections
are offered, a more comprehensive measurement of connectivity might also consider the
connection time.
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Figure 5.14 Average Number of Connections versus Degree of Peaking
5.2.3 Change in connection times
While the number of possible connections a passenger can make may not have been
significantly changed when American depeaked its banks, one would suspect that the
average connection time increased. Figure 5.15 is a comparison of the individual
itineraries distributed by connection times (in 5-minute intervals) for all American
Airlines itineraries connecting through O'Hare in March and April of 2002. The data
show a marked increase in the number of itineraries with 80 to 140 minutes of connection
time, and a corresponding decrease in the number of itineraries with connection times
between 45 and 65 minutes. The average itinerary connection time changed from 79
minutes in March 2002 to 85 minutes in April 2002. These data are summarized in Table
5-5.
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Table 5-5 Average Scheduled Time per Connection for All Itineraries, AA and UA at ORD
March 2002
April 2002
AA at ORD
Number of
daily scheduled
arrivals
Average
scheduled time
per connection
UA at ORD
Number of daily
scheduled
arrivals
Average
scheduled time
per connection
An alternative way to evaluate the change in connection times would be to first
group the itineraries by Origin-Destination (OD) market, and then consider the average
connection time for any2 combination of flights serving that market. Figure 5.16 shows
how the average connection time per OD market that American serves through O'Hare
changed between March 2002 and April 2002. In this chart, the data again show that
connection times have increased after the depeaking of American's flight banks. The
increase in connection time per OD market was 5 minutes, fairly consistent with the
2 The reader is reminded that for this analysis, only the 'first best connections' are part of the set of
itineraries. Please see Section 31 and/or Appendix A for a more complete explanation.
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overall average increase of 6 minutes. The average connection times per OD market are
summarized in Table 5-6.
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Table 5-6 Average Scheduled Time per Connection by OD Market, AA and UA at ORD
AA at ORD
Average
connection time
per OD market
6036 86 min
5863 91 min
UA at ORD
Number of
OD markets
7549 82 min
7703 82 min
Figure 5.17 and Figure 5.18 compare the connection times of American and
United flights connecting through O'Hare in April 2002 for all possible itineraries and
itineraries summarized by OD market, respectively. The United OD market data includes
only markets that are also served by AA, thus making a more direct comparison. Both
sets of data show that United Airlines offers passengers a greater number of connection
times between 45 and 80 minutes than does American Airlines. The UA data presented
in these figures are also summarized in Table 5-5 and Table 5-6.
OD
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Figure 5.17 Comparison of Itinerary Connection Times, AA and UA Flights Connecting
through ORD, April 2002
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5.2.4 Alternative Paths
Examining American Airlines's change at one hub in isolation of the schedules and
connection offerings at its other hubs limits the understanding of the possible effects of
depeaking. As an example, consider the OD market LAX-BOS. A customer planning to
make a trip from Los Angeles to Boston will have at least four different flight path
options on American Airlines: a direct flight path with no stops or connections, a flight
path with a stop or connection at ORD, a flight path with a stop or connection at STL, or
a flight path with a stop or connection at DFW. Further, each of those different flight
paths may be offered multiple times and various times of day. Table 5-7 and Table 5-8
summarize American's offerings in this market for March and April of 2002 and July
2001 and July 2002, respectively.
Table 5-7 Summary of Various American Airlines LAX-BOS Flight Paths for March 2002
and April 2002
Number of possible
Sitineraries
Average elapsed
time (min)
Average connection
time (min)
Number of possible
e itineraries
Average elapsed
time (min)
Average connection
time (min)
Total
20
440*
62
Total
21
452*
63
Direct
3
323
N/A
Direct
3
337
N/A
Connect
at ORD
7
435
60
Connect
at ORD
7
453
68
Connect
at DFW
5
453
56
Connect
at DFW
6
468
55
Connect
at STL
5
435
71
Connect
at STL
5
431
67
* Average trip time calculation includes only connecting itineraries, not direct itineraries.
I
Table 5-8 Summary of Various American Airlines LAX-BOS Flight Paths for July 20013
and July 2002
Number of possible
itineraries
Average elapsed time
S(min)
Average connection
time (min)
Number of possible
itineraries
Average elapsed time
S(min)
* Average connection
time (min)
Total
26
440*
62
Total
23
466*
64
Direct
5
341
N/A
Direct
4
336
N/A
Connect
at ORD
8
445
60
Connect
at ORD
7
459
65
Connect
at DFW
7
469
56
Connect
at DFW
7
490
67
Connect
at STL
6
439
71
Connect
at STL
5
442
58
* Average trip time calculation includes only connecting itineraries, not direct itineraries.
Looking at the OD market level summary data, one can quickly see the difficulty
in isolating the effects of the depeaked banks. In both comparisons, there have been
changes in more than the connection times at O'Hare. The average direct flight times
have changed, as have the average connecting times at the Dallas and St. Louis hubs. For
each month listed, the connecting path with the shortest average elapsed time was
through STL even though in July 2001, March 2002, and April 2002, the shortest
connection time was through DFW.
Table 5-9 summarizes which of American's three main hubs (DFW, ORD, or
STL) have the shortest total elapsed time for various directional connecting markets. The
markets summarized are markets with at least one connecting itinerary offered through
ORD and at least one connecting itinerary offered through either DFW or STL. The data
show a shift in shortest elapsed time from ORD to STL from March to April 2002. The
July year over year comparison again shows an increase in the percentage of markets
with the shortest elapsed time through STL, but also shows an increase at ORD. This
3 The July 2001 itinerary data consider TWA flight information as AA flight information.
and July 
2002
--- ~~- -
comparison is complicated by the fact that the STL flights still operated under the TWA
name in July 2001. These same data are presented graphically in Figure 5.19.
Table 5-9 Proportion of Shortest Average Elapsed Time for AA Directional OD Markets
with Paths Connecting Through ORD and at Least One Other AA Hub
July 2001
March 2002
April 2002
July 2002
Number of
directional
connecting
markets
2,371
3,248
3,116
3,085
Fraction of flights with
pse tim e
STL
37%
36%
44%
45%
shortest average ela
DFW
32%
23%
23%
23%
ORD
31%
41%
33%
32%
El STL
MORD
UDFW
Jul 01 Mar 02 Apr 02 Jul 02
Figure 5.19 Distribution of Shortest Elapsed Time for AA ORD Connecting Markets
Both of these market specific analyses demonstrate the complexity in trying to
evaluate the network effects of American's schedule change at O'Hare. It is unlikely that
one hub schedule was created in isolation of the other two. If passengers are more likely
to select flights based on total elapsed time rather than just connection time, then it would
be important for an airline to understand how an average shift in connection times at one
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hub will affect connecting passenger flight selection based on the airline's other path
offerings. In the specific case of American Airlines at O'Hare, one might hypothesize
that after the depeaking in April, some connecting passengers would shift their choice of
path from connecting through ORD to connecting through STL, while others would opt
instead for a shorter elapsed time on another carrier.
5.3 Analysis of Schedule "Performance"
The previous section attempted to better understand the changes made in American
Airlines's schedule at O'Hare in April 2002, in the context of network effects. Coupling
this understanding of how possible connecting paths were affected with the
understanding of schedule density varied throughout the day (Section 5.1), one can begin
to evaluate the schedule performance. The performance of an airline schedule can be
evaluated from multiple perspectives including market share, operations, and cost. Often,
these are considered to have conflicting goals. A systems view, however, considers
profitability as the overarching goal and market share (as a proxy for revenue),
operations, and cost as the important components of profitability.
The goals of revenue, operational, and cost performance are not only interrelated,
but also have both long and short-term effects. For example, poor operational
performance may not have near term revenue effects, but may lead to frustrated
passengers who eventually stop flying a particular airline. Unfortunately, the complexity
of the airline system, as well as the organizational structure of traditional hub and spoke
airlines make these holistic views of profit optimization difficult to model, measure, and
predict. This section will analyze and discuss American's new flight schedule from the
separate perspectives of revenue, operations, and cost and then summarize the analysis at
a system level.
5.3.1 Market Share performance
Assuming fares to be competitive, and system capacity to be constant, a better
performing schedule from a revenue perspective will contain flight options that are more
attractive to more passengers If one believes time and flexibility to be important factors
in passenger choice, then optimizing a schedule for market share would imply short
connection times and frequent and/or redundant flight paths. As demonstrated in Section
5.2, evaluating or understanding the changes in American Airlines's schedule at ORD in
the context of American's entire flight network is extremely challenging. Predicting
customer choice based on the various flight offerings of different airlines introduces
another order of magnitude of complexity.
5.3.1.a System-level market share
As discussed in Section 5.2, it is important to consider AA's change in the context of the
entire system. Schedule changes at ORD might or might not result in overall itinerary or
market share performance. Table 5-10 shows the network level domestic market shares
(from CRS data) for American Airlines for the months of July 2001, April 2002, March
2002, and July 2002. In this analysis, the July 2001 system market share was calculated
by combining TWA and AA system shares.
Table 5-10 CRS System-Level Market Share Data, American Airlines Domestic Markets
July 2001
March 2002
April 2002
July 2002
Number of
directional
OD markets
23,108
23,044
21,940
22,238
AA System
share
21.7%
23.0%
22.0%
22.0%
The American market shares show an increase from July 2001 that might be
attributable to the synergy of merging AA and TWA in the beginning of 2002. There
was a decrease in system-wide market share from March to April 2002, which might be
attributable to a decrease in schedule attractiveness due to an average increase in
connection times at for flights passing through ORD.
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5.3.1.b O'Hare connecting markets
The market shares most likely to be affected by the changed bank structure, are those that
have connections at O'Hare. Table 5-9 summarizes market share data for AA markets
with connections through ORD. The July 2001 CRS hub data contained an error in
combining the AA and TW data, and therefore are not presented. The data show that
although the 3-hub combined market share for markets did not change, the actual share of
passengers connecting through ORD did decrease from March to April 2002. These data
imply that while fewer connecting passengers passed though ORD, STL and/or DFW
appear to have picked up additional passengers so that the system still carried the same
share, or slightly more.
Table 5-11 CRS Market Share Estimates, American Airlines All Domestic Markets
Connecting through ORD
July 2001
March 2002
April 2002
July 2002
Number of
directional
connecting
markets
5,282
5,768
5,576
5,646
AA
3-Hub
share
14.6%
14.6%
14.7%
AA
ORD
share
4.2%
4.0%
3.8%
4.2%
AA
System
share
22.2%
20.3%
20.9%
21.1%
5.3.1.c Chicago local markets
Since O'Hare is a major hub for American with significant competition from United
Airlines, and Chicago is a city with two airports, the secondary one served by Southwest,
it is equally important to examine the change in market share for local markets
originating or terminating in Chicago. In this analysis, Chicago O'Hare and Midway
flights and markets are summarized and considered as CHI markets. This means that the
predicted share is for passengers taking any AA flight out of ORD or MDW to a common
destination. Table 5-12 shows the local market shares for all AA domestic Chicago
markets. The data show an increase in local passenger share from March 2002 to April
2002. Year over year in July the market share held constant.
I
Table 5-12 CRS Market Share Estimates, American Airlines All Local Domestic Chicago
Markets
July 2001
March 2002
April 2002
July 2002
Number of
directional
local
markets
288
272
310
310
AA CHI
share
33.6%
33.2%
35.4%
33.5%
5.3.1.d Market Share performance summary
Overall, American Airlines's system level market share decreased slightly when the
schedule change took effect at O'Hare. At the same time, connecting market share
through ORD also decreased slightly, but the local Chicago market share increased.
These trends suggest that while American Airlines did lose some market share due to its
increased connection times, those lost connecting passengers may have been partially
replaced by local passengers. Since local passengers are often higher yield than
connecting passengers one might conclude that from a market share perspective,
American's decision to depeak was revenue neutral.
5.3.2 Operational performance
Well performing schedules from an operations perspective will first and foremost,
operate smoothly, if not on time. On-time or 'smooth' performance implies a schedule
that allows enough time for passengers to make connections and airport personnel to
service aircraft, transfer luggage and cargo, and board the next group of passengers. A
good schedule for operations will also take into account that the schedule and its specific
fleet and crew assignments will seldom operate perfectly, and provide some level of
robustness.
Weather, unexpected maintenance, incoming delays can all effect operational
performance, and a schedule that makes allowance for these potential problems might
operate more effectively. All else equal, optimizing a schedule for operational
performance implies longer connection times for passengers, longer turn times for aircraft
I
(the amount of time a specific aircraft remains at the gate), and flexibility for gate and
fleet swapping. There is some debate, however, whether a schedule with continuous
flows of arrivals and departures will be more or less robust in times of irregular
operations. With a highly peaked schedule, the valleys of inactivity allow the carriers
and the airport a time cushion for recovery. If a carrier has a steady flow of flights, then
it is possible that delayed flights will continue to pile up throughout the day, and the
schedule will not be recovered.
This section will use DOT flight actual flight performance data to assess the
operational effects of American's decision to depeak its banks at O'Hare. All data are for
actual mainline flights flown, and do not include commuter flight performance or any
scheduled flights that were cancelled. Additionally, the data consider only AA flights
operated at ORD in July 2001 as opposed to including any TWA flights.
5.3.2.a On-time performance analysis
Airlines report on-time flight information to the Department of Transportation (DOT) in a
number of forms. For example, for each departure, the airline reports whether the flight
departed before or at the scheduled departure time (Departure :00), and whether the flight
departed at or before five minutes past the scheduled departure time (Departure :05).
Similarly, for each arrival, airlines report Arrival :00, Arrival :05, and Arrival :14.
In times of "normal" industry operations the change in on-time performance could
be useful in determining the operational performance of the newly depeaked schedule.
With airline schedules and capacity decreased, however, on-time performance is
improving for all airlines, and schedule effects might not be apparent. Comparing July
year over year in addition to March and April of 2002, might help to separate these
effects.
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Figure 5.21 American Airlines Departure On-Time :00%, System-wide, July 2001 and July
2002
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The system wide on-time Departure :00 % for American Airlines in March and
April 2002, and July 2001 and 2002 are shown in Figure 5.20 and Figure 5.21,
respectively. Each month of data shows the trend of on-time departure percentage
starting out high in the early morning, decreasing as the day progresses, and then rising
again as the number of departures tapers out in the evening. This trend is expected, as
delays that occur in the morning tend to propagate throughout the day: late departures
leading to late arrivals, turning again into late departures. Comparing March and April
2002 data, one sees an improvement in departure performance in the beginning to
midday, with that improvement disappearing by the end of the day. A similar trend is
seen between the July 2001 and July 2002 data. The corresponding Arrival :00% data
also show similar trends, but less overall improvement. These data can be viewed in
Figure B9 in Appendix B.
A summary of system-level average on-time departure and arrival data for July
2001, March 2002, April 2002, and July 2002 is recorded in Table 5-13. The total
number of flights is clearly down year over year in July 2002. Part of this decrease in
flights can be attributed to an over all schedule depression following September 11, 2001,
and part is likely due to consolidation of TWA and AA flight schedules. All on-time
measurements improved from July 2001 to July 2002 and March 2002 to April 2002.
More improvement was seen for Departure :00 and Arrival :00 than for Departure :05 and
Arrival :14. A similar look at the on-time arrival and departure statistics for AA flights at
ORD might help to determine what if any of this on-time improvement can be attributed
to network effects of the schedule change at ORD.
Figure 5.22 and Figure 5.23 show the ORD on-time Departure :00% for March
and April 2002, and July 2001 and 2002, respectively. The data show similar, but more
exaggerated trends throughout the day as the system-wide data. This makes sense as the
scheduled departure and arrival times are reported in local time, so the level of flight
activity, builds more gradually at a system level, so the amplification of delays would be
expected to be more severe at a station level. Just as at the system level, the arrival data
show similar trends, but less improvement throughout the day. These arrival data for
ORD arrivals can be viewed in Figure B10 Appendix B.
Table 5-13 System-Wide Monthly On-Time Performance for AA, July 20014, March 2002,
April 2002, July 2002
Avg. Daily Flights
Departure :00%
Departure :05%
Arrival:00%
Arrival :14%
2,823
60.4%
75.2%
57.9%
79.1%
March 2002
2,332
65.5%
77.1%
59.7%
80.4%-
April 2002
2,397
71.9%
81.8%
65.5%
83.8%
2,473
65.1%
76.5%
62.5%
80.3%
AA at ORD
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American Airlines Departure On-Time
and April 2002
:00%, for All Flights at ORD, March
4 The system level data for July 2001 include TWA flight arrival and departure statistics along with AA
statistics.
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Figure 5.23 American Airlines Departure On-Time :00%, for All Flights at ORD, July 2001
and July 2002
Table 5-14 and Table 5-15 contain the monthly arrival and departure performance
data for July 2001, March 2002, April 2002, and July 2002 for AA flights at ORD and
DFW respectively. At both hubs, the on-time performance was improved April over
March and July over July. Compared with the system wide data, both hubs perform
worse than average in departure performance. ORD also performs worse than average in
arrival performance, but flights arriving at DFW tend to arrive on time more often than
the system average. This fact highlights a potential deficiency of the DWF hub since if
flights are arriving on average earlier than other flights in the system, one would expect
that DFW would also have a higher than average on-time departure percentage. This is
not the case; as the Departure :00% at DFW is lower than the Arrival :00% implying
aircraft cannot be turned in the appropriated amount of time at DFW.
Table 5-14 AA at ORD Monthly On-Time Performance of Mainline Flights, July 2001,
March 2002, April 2002, July 2002
July 2001 March 2002 April 2002 July 2002
Avg. Dally Flights 312 275 . 297 313
Departure :00% 55% . 59% 68% 64%
Arrival :00% 55% 58% 62% 64%
Table 5-15 AA at DFW Monthly On-Time Performance of Mainline Flights, July 2001,
March 2002, April 2002, July 2002
July 2001 March 2002 April 2002 July 2002
Avg. Daily Flights 477 425 433 444
Departure :00% 44% 53% 66% 59%
Arrival :00% 61% 61% 68% 63%
The data imply that a system-wide improvement in on-time performance may
have occurred after September 11, 2001. The additional improvement in April 2002 at
ORD allowed American to maintain a higher level of performance in July 2002, when the
total number of daily departures was equal to that of July 2001. The same argument
cannot be made in the case of flights at the DFW hub as the total number of daily flights
in July 2002 is still below that of July 2001. On the other hand, capacity was still
reduced system-wide in July 2002, and while American might have operated the same
number of flights at ORD, the total number of daily flights at ORD were still decreased,
and might have accounted for the sustained improvement.
Another uncertainty concerning on-time performance as pointed out in Section
5.2.4 is that some scheduled trip times were changed. To help understand whether the
adjustment of individual market trip times would greatly affect the on-time performance
data, the average changes in flight time and connection time were calculated. Figure 5.24
shows these changes in average times such that the times plotted for March 2002 show
the difference from times scheduled in July 2001, the April times represent the difference
compared with March, etc. These data show that while the average connection time may
have increased significantly in April 2002, the average scheduled flight times had
decreased significantly. Thus, by July 2002, the average total elapsed time had actually
decreased approximately 1 minute from July 2001. This implies that any on-time
performance improvements were not artificially induced by changes in block time.
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Figure 5.24 Change in Average Flight and Connection
ORD
Times for AA Flights Connecting at
5.3.2.b Delay minutes
In addition to reporting whether a flight is on time or not, airlines report the length of
each departure or arrival delay. Figure 5.25 shows the average length of departure delay
per delayed flight as a function of scheduled departure time for all American Airlines
flights departing in March and April 2002. Comparing these data with Figure 5.22, one
can see that not only are more delays occurring as the day progresses, but the average
delays are getting longer. At a system level, there does not appear to be much difference
in the average length of delay during the months selected for comparison.
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Figure 5.25 Average Number of Departure Delay Minutes per Flight, American Airlines
System-wide Departures, March and April 2002
Figure 5.26 shows the same departure delay time for American Airlines
departures from O'Hare. In general, the hub airport shows the same trend of increasing
average delay time throughout the day as the system data; however, there appears to be
more variation from March to April. Table 5-16 summarizes the average delay time per
delayed arrival and departure for AA flights at a system level, at ORD, and at DFW for
the months of July 2001, March 2002, April 2002, and July 2002. The average number
of departure delay minutes for flights departing from ORD decreased nearly 5 minutes
from March to April 2002. There was also a 2 minute decrease year over year in July.
Meanwhile, there was an increase in departure delay minutes both system wide and at
DFW. This implies that the depeaked schedule helped to improve departure performance
at O'Hare.
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Figure 5.26 Average Number of Departure Delay Minutes per Flight, American Airlines
Departures at ORD, March and April 2002
Table 5-16 Monthly Delay Time per Delayed Mainline Flight for AA, July 2001, March
2002, April 2002, July 2002
System
ORD
< c DFW
System
S5 a 9ORD
Se v y DFW
July 2001
2,823
312
477
24.0
28.4
18.2
March
2002
2,332
275
425
25.3
27.9
24.5
April
2002
2,397
297
433
26.2
23.0
28.1
July
2002
2,473
313
444
27.4
26.3
26.5
5.3.2.c Taxi times
Figure 5.28 and Figure 5.27 show both the distribution of departures and the average taxi-
out time per departure for American Airlines flights out of ORD for July 2001 and July
2002, and March 2002 and April 2002, respectively. Both sets of July data show the
average taxi-out time gradually increasing throughout the day, peaking in early afternoon
g40
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and decreasing as the number of flights tapers off at the end of the day. The July 2002
taxi-out times seem to be slightly lower than the July 2001 times even though the total
number of departures is about the same. The March and April 2002 data show a more
steady taxi-out time throughout the day, and little difference between the times for the
two months.
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Figure 5.27 Taxi Out Time for American Airlines Departures at ORD, March 20012 and
April 2002
Table 5-17 summarizes the average taxi-in and taxi-out times for all American
Airlines flights arriving and departing ORD in July 2001, March 2002, April 2002, and
July 2002. The taxi-in times are significantly lower than the taxi-out times. This makes
sense because any delay due to congestion for an arriving flight will occur prior to
landing, while airport congestion prior to take-off will directly affect the taxi-out time.
There was a decrease in average taxi-in time of about 1 minute from March to April
2002. The taxi-out time was constant over the same period. Both taxi-in and taxi-out
times showed slight improvement from July 2001 to July 2002. The improvement in the
July over July data suggest that any taxi-out time improvements might have been a result
of an overall decrease in airport congestion at O'Hare rather than the change in
American's departure schedule. Further, the taxi-out times are affected not only by
American's degree of peaking in its flight schedule, but also by the degree of peaking of
competitors' schedules and ultimately, the degree of peaking of the overall airport
schedule.
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Taxi Out
2002
Avg. Daily
Flights
Avg. taxi-out
time (min)
Avg. taxi-in
time (min)
Time for American Airlines Departures at ORD, July 2001 and July
D Monthly Average Taxi-out Times for Mainline Flights, July 2001 s,
March 2002, April 2002, July 2002
July 2001
312
22.4
8.8
March 2002
275
19.1
9.7
April 2002
297
19.3
8.5
5 In the AA ORD July 2001 data, the on-time statistics for the 10 daily TWA flights are not included.
Including these flights, AA+TWA operated an average of 322 daily flights out of ORD.
Figure 5.28
Table 5-17 AA at OR]
July 2002
313
21.0
8.5
4c
5.3.2.d Summary of operational analysis
American Airlines has had overall on-time performance improvement and a decrease in
departure delay minutes at O'Hare. While it is not possible to conclude that these
improvements can be attributed solely to the depeaking of banks, one can definitely
conclude that the depeaking did not worsen on-time performance or increase delay
minutes or taxi times. A more comprehensive evaluation of operational performance
would include measures of passenger and baggage misconnects, scheduled and aircraft
turn times, and recovery times from disruptions such as security breaches and inclement
weather.
5.3.3 Cost performance
From a cost perspective, a well performing, or low cost schedule will take into account
factors such as fleet utilization, airport facilities and equipment utilization, labor costs
and productivity, and the cost of recovering from disruptions. As no specific cost data
were available, the estimation of the performance of the depeaked schedule from a cost
perspective will be a discussion of expected trends.
Given the more steady flow of arrivals and departures, one would expect
equipment utilization to improve. In a schedule with highly peaked arrival banks,
equipment will wait at spoke stations until the appropriate time to take off and meet the
scheduled arrival bank at the hub station. In a schedule with depeaked banks, planes can
be scheduled to arrive a spoke station and then quickly return. This should significantly
improve fleet utilization, or the number of hours throughout the day that a given aircraft
spends in the air versus on the ground.
A more steady flow of departures could also result in fewer customers needing to
check in at lobby areas or pass through security points at any given time. Similarly,
given a more steady flow of flights into and out of the hub airport, one would expect that
gates, maintenance equipment, luggage transfer equipment, and outsourced services such
as cleaning and catering would be more effectively utilized. If there are always some
flights taking off and some flights landing, then the average number of planes on the
ground at a hub at any given time should be reduced. If the reduction was significant
enough, then fewer gates would be needed to handle the same number of daily flights.
If fewer gates and other equipment were needed, then fewer personnel would be
required to staff those gates and operate that equipment. More importantly, the
employees at the hub station would no longer have long periods of downtime as with
more peaked schedules. This consistent level of productivity would mean that employees
were paid for the same amount of time that was spent working. Flight crews may also
experience such productivity improvements, as their schedules would no longer
automatically include a Inng period of downtime waiting for the next departure bank.
Furthermore, if scheduled block times can be reduced due to less ramp and runway
congestion at peak times, then flight crew costs will go down. Finally, if fewer
passengers miss their connections due to slightly increased connection times, the costs of
rebooking those passengers could be avoided.
The magnitude of the previously described employee productivity improvements
can be best estimated by considering the number of departures "in-work" at any given
time throughout the day. Figure 5.29 shows the moving sum of scheduled departures for
both March and April 2002. The number of scheduled flights per interval are normalized
by the total number of daily flights. This moving sum is meant to be a proxy for the
number of departing flights that are "in-work" during any given 15-minute interval.
Whether or not the level of staffing decreases, will depend on what level of
coverage American Airlines was previously using. If American was previously staffing
at the 10% of scheduled departures level, they might now be staffing at the 7 or 8% level.
In each of these cases, the level of coverage will not be enough to completely cover all
time periods. If American chose to staff to the highest peak throughout the day, then
before the change, it would have staffed for the 12.5% of schedule departures level, and
after the change, at the 10% level. In either case, there would be a slight decreased in the
required staffing level.
Figure 5.30 through Figure 5.32 show the distribution of the number of arrivals or
departures scheduled per 15-minute interval for AA at ORD in March and April 2002,
and WN at PHX in April 2002, respectively. Only the intervals from 6AM to 10PM were
considered. These charts are helpful in understanding not only the variation of scheduled
flights throughout the day and the maximum flights per interval, but also the amount of
potential downtime in the schedule, represented by the count of intervals without any
scheduled flights. They can also be helpful in making an estimate of relative productivity
of American's new schedule compared with Southwest.
1070
14%
S12%
10%
0 8%
o
S6%
$ 4%
% 2
0%
Time of day (hhmm)
Figure 5.29 60-Minute Moving Sum of Percentage of Scheduled Departures per 15-minute
Interval, AA at ORD March, April 2002
After depeaking, American's distribution of scheduled departures per 15-mintue
interval had less variation throughout the day. The maximum number of flights
scheduled in any interval dropped from 18 in March to 9 in April. Meanwhile,
Southwest's departure schedule at Phoenix had a maximum of 6 flights per 15-minute
interval. Also noticeable, is that while Southwest's schedule has a strong peak around 2-
3 departures per interval, American has two less significant peaks at 3 and 7 departures
per interval. This difference implies that while American may have some productivity
gains as a result of depeaking, their productivity is not likely to match that of Southwest.
If the scheduled departure distribution had a stronger peak around 4 or 5 departures per
interval, then the gain may have been greater.
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Figure 530 Distribution of Scheduled Flights per 15-minute Interval, American Airlines at
ORD Domestic Mainline Flights, March 2002
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ORD Domestic Mainline Flights, April 2002
WN at PHX
25
20
ights per 515-mintue nterval
E
z
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Flights per 15-mintue Interval
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PHX Domestic Mainline Flights, April 2002
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6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The analysis of American Airlines's decision to depeak its flight schedule at O'Hare
International Airport showed that the decision was neutral from a market share
perspective, neutral or favorable from an operations perspective, and likely favorable
from a cost perspective. As expected, connection times for the first best connection for a
given OD market increased, but only by an average of 5 to 6 minutes. Arriving flights
had an average of two fewer possible connections. Meanwhile, the maximum number of
arrivals or departures scheduled for a given 15-minute interval decreased from 18 to 9
flights, and the number of 15-minute intervals from 6AM to 10PM without any scheduled
departures dropped from 17 to 3.
System-level market share and connecting market share at ORD showed a slight
decline from March to April; however local Chicago market share increased over the
same time period, and the 3-hub connecting share held constant. These trends imply that
while fewer passengers were making connections at O'Hare, more local passengers were
flying on American flights and some connecting passengers were making connections
through St. Louis and Dallas rather than through ORD. The analysis suggested that
American made limited if any market share gains because of the change, but certainly did
not lose significant market share. Given the lack of fare or revenue data and the inherent
variability of CRS data, it was not possible to make a judgment about schedule
performance from a revenue perspective.
On-time departure performance improved both system wide and at ORD in the
given time period. While an improvement was noticed from March to April 2002, there
was also a year over year improvement in July 2002. This implies that some operational
improvement may have been due to an overall decrease in the number of flights in the
system, as similar improvements were seen at other hubs and for other carriers. At the
same time, the data showed that the improvement at O'Hare was greater than the system
wide improvement. Taxi-in times improved for American Airlines flights arriving at
O'Hare, implying less congestion for aircraft in the AA gate areas. Taxi-out times did
not improve, however, suggesting that even though American had depeaked its schedule,
the fact that competitors maintained peaked schedules meant that overall airport taxiway
and runway congestion did not significantly decrease. Finally, an overall cost benefit in
the form of employee productivity and equipment utilization was expected based on the
reduction of the number of aircraft on the ground at any given time.
American Airlines has made a significant departure from the traditional hub and
spoke paradigm of scheduling hub departures and arrivals in peaked banks. Whether or
not this strategy can fix the financial difficulties of American or other traditional hub and
spoke operators such as United or Delta is at this point unknown. While a number of
analysts agree that implementation of a rolling hub, is an important element of carrier
recover, they also agree that this is just one step (Costa et al. 2002, Donoghue 2002,
Hansson et al. 2002). Embracing this paradigm shift and accepting it as a necessary step,
however will be difficult for many airlines. As suggested by former US Airways
Executive, this idea frightens airline executives because "it reduces costs more than it
increases revenue." (McDonald 2002)
Still, there may be other obstacles to individual carrier as well as industry
recovery. With the current war in Iraq and SARS epidemic in the Far East, both
international and domestic travel are even more depressed. Without passengers flying
and revenue coming in, it may be difficult to realize fully the benefits from strategic
changes. For example, being able to operate the same number of flights with few planes
currently means that those planes can be retired from the fleet. In times of increased
passenger traffic, those valuable assets could instead be used for route expansion or new
route service rather than retired. Additionally, during this time of poor financial
performance, productivity benefits have a negative impact on morale if they lead to more
layoffs. If the industry was in a stage of growth, or a steady state, then productivity
benefits could be enacted through attrition or reduced hiring rates. Also, with enhanced
airport security measures preventing last minute passenger check-ins, passengers are
arriving earlier, airlines are boarding flights sooner, and on-time performance is
improving for many carriers; thus, making the argument for improved operational
performance becomes more difficult.
Finally, there are the questions of whether this change in strategy will be
sustainable in the future, and if it can be applied universally at all hub airports. If the
economy again enters a cycle of high growth, will passenger revenues again increase? If
passenger revenues increase, will traditional hub and spoke carriers again be able to
compete based primarily on time? Should other traditional hub and spoke carriers follow
suit, or do they have the incentive to instead stay with their current strategy? If United
Airlines decided to depeak its schedule at ORD, perhaps operational improvements for
both United and American would increase beyond individual improvements, as the
overall airport schedule will become less peaked. On the other hand, United might
decided to maintain its peaked schedule, holding firm to the idea that the shortest
connection times will attract the greatest revenue.
At the time of publication of this thesis, American had implemented a depeaked
schedule in Dallas, but did not yet have similar plans for its St. Louis hub (Ott 2003).
Perhaps American will not be willing to take the risk of losing connecting flow through
an airport that might not have a large enough population to fill seats with local
passengers. If American Airlines is able to avoid Chapter 11 bankruptcy and survive this
industry downturn, then the strategy will truly be tested and perhaps these additional
questions will be answered.
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APPENDIX A CONNECTION BUILDING AND ITINERARY GENERATION
Connection building and itinerary generation was performed using an in-house model at
United Airlines. The analyses performed in this thesis are biased by the parameters used
in the connection generation rules. The relevant rules and their corresponding parameter
values are presented here so that the reader may better understand the set of connections
and itineraries used in the analyses.
Minimum Connection Times:
United uses a database with extensive airport information to determine minimum
connection times for each airline/airport combination.
Connection Circuity:
The itinerary builder has an option for limiting the set of viable itineraries with respect to
distance flown. For this research the itinerary builder required that any connecting
itinerary A-B-C meet the following restriction:
AB + BC 5 2AC,
where AB is the distance between points A and B, BC is the distance between points B
and C, and AC is the non-stop distance between points A and C. See Figure A.1.
B
Figure A.1 Schematic of Sample Flight Routings from Point A to C
Total Elapsed Time:
In addition to the previously described distance restriction, connecting itineraries are also
restricted in total elapsed time. The following restriction was used for building valid
itineraries:
TA + +TB B5 240 +TAc,
where TAB, TB, TBC, TAC equal the flight time from Station A to Station B, the connection
time at Station B, the flight time from Station B to Station C, and the non-stop flight time
from Station A to Station C, in minutes respectively. Again, refer to Figure A.1. Any
possible itinerary with a total elapsed time of greater than 240 minutes plus the direct
flying time will be considered invalid.
First Best and Second Best Connections:
The final itinerary generation rule of interest is whether or not the collection of feasible
itineraries includes second best connections or not. To help explain this rule, Figure A.2
shows various flight arrivals and departures to and from Station B over time. Each arrow
represents a different flight arrival or departures; those labeled Al and A2 and Cl and C2
represent two arrivals from Station A and two departures to Station C, respectively.
If the Second Best Connection option is turned on, then the set of valid itineraries
will include Al-B-Cl, A2-B-C2, as well as Al-B-C2. If the Second Best Connection
option is turned off, then only Al-B-Cl and A2-B-C2 are included in the set of valid
itineraries.
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Figure A.2 Depiction of Various Flight Arrivals and Departures at Station B
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Figure B.1 Comparison of Scheduled Departures per 15-minute Interval, American
Airlines at ORD, July 2001 and July 2002
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Figure B.2 American Airlines at DFW Departures in 15-Minute Intervals, April 2002
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Figure B.3 American Airlines at STL Departures in 15-Minute Intervals, April 2002
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Figure B.4 United Airlines at DEN Departures in 15-minute Intervals, April 2002
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Figure B.5 Southwest Airlines at MDW Departures in 15-minute Intervals, April 2002
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Figure B.6 American Airlines at DFW Departures in 15-Minute Intervals,
Normalized by Number of Flights
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Figure B.7 United Airlines at DEN Departures in 15-minute Intervals, April 2002,
Normalized by Number of Flights
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Figure B.8 Southwest Airlines at MDW Departures in 15-minute Intervals, April 2002
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Figure B.9 American Airlines Arrival On-Time :00%, System-wide for All Domestic
Airports
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Figure B.10 American Airlines Arrival On-Time :00%, for All Flights at ORD
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